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Impact of Industrial Linkages on Firm 
Performance in Development Zones
The Case of Jiangsu Province
Abstract: This article investigates the effect of industrial linkages on firm perfor-
mance in Chinese development zones, using Jiangsu Province as a case study. 
An ordered response model based on the dependent variable being ordinal was 
developed. The empirical results reveal an insignificant relationship between indus-
trial linkages and firm performance. our interpretation of this finding mainly lies 
with the global and domestic challenges that have changed the way participating 
firms operate and organize in the development zones of Jiangsu. When many other 
economic factors take precedence over industrial linkages in driving superior 
firm performance, firms feel it less important to get closer to their suppliers or 
customers, therefore weakening the impact of industrial linkages. Although this 
article primarily focuses on development zones in Jiangsu Province, the findings 
and discussion will provide insights for other development zones in China that 
may be, reviewing their development strategies because most of them have similar 
development problems.
A development zone is a designated area within a country where firms gather together 
to participate in various economic activities promoted by a set of policy instruments 
not generally applicable to the rest of the country (Ge 1999). Given this definition, 
participating firms in development zones are much influenced by government-specific 
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policies and, at the same time, tend to be highly agglomerated and interdependent. 
One widely observed agglomeration phenomenon in development zones involves 
industrial linkages, that is, clusters of vertically related firms. Theoretically, the more 
that related firms cluster together, the lower the cost of production, and the greater 
the market in which the firms can sell. Even though firms in the same cluster area 
may differ significantly in their relative factor intensities, there are still potential 
advantages to the close proximity of buyers and sellers because cluster firms are 
able to attract more suppliers and customers than a single firm. 
While evidence regarding the importance of industrial linkages in the process of 
agglomeration is abundant, the full importance of the industrial linkages that drive 
the economic performance of firms in development zones is not always clear, espe-
cially in East Asian nations. In this regard, China provides an interesting empirical 
study. Historically, Chinese development zones evolved from the “experimental 
fields” during the implementation of economic restructuring and opening-up policies 
in the 1980s, to the “high grounds” of the export-oriented economy of the 1990s, 
and the “boosters” for current technological upgrades and industrial structure ad-
justments. Development zones are one of China’s key economic engines and have 
made a remarkable contribution to its economic strength by improving economic 
competitiveness and promoting national development. Chinese central and local 
governments attach great importance to development zones and for this reason grant 
them generous incentive packages, such as advantageous geographic locations, 
improved infrastructure and facilities, duty-free status, tax holidays, and simplified 
administrative procedures and regulations. From the standpoint of participating firms 
in development zones, these incentives can all be translated into lower production 
costs and, all else being equal, higher potential profits. Chinese development zones 
are often accompanied by clustering of industrial activities, such as better access 
to markets and suppliers, labor pooling, and easy flow of technological expertise. 
In terms of industrial linkages, cluster firms are expected to easily augment their 
competitive advantages by improving customer and supplier linkages and/or back-
ward and forward linkages and promoting the development of distinctive business 
cultures to increase interfirm communication and understanding. These cluster gains 
have mostly been static, but the degree of dynamic gain varies greatly from case to 
case among development zones and even among participating firms, as suggested 
by relevant empirically based studies. With the explosive boom of development 
zones since the early 1990s, many problems associated with labor costs, land-use 
planning, regional protectionism, and abuse of policy and administrative systems 
have emerged and overshadowed their contributions to regional and national eco-
nomic development. With China’s accelerated integration into the world economy, 
development zones created to grant preferential treatment to foreign investors will 
gradually lose their competitive advantages over other areas in China. Under these 
changing circumstances, many researchers and policymakers have begun to think 
about the impact these changes will have on development zones and what strategy 
can help to sustain the development of these areas. 
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Despite a considerable amount of research work available on Chinese develop-
ment zones, few empirical studies have been done at the firm-level scale to explore 
the relationship between industrial linkages and firm performance. We believe 
that understanding how to maintain a firm’s competitiveness and improve its per-
formance is strategically important because participating firms are the principal 
components of development zones. Their superior performance is key to the sus-
tainability of development zones. To provide firm managers and policymakers with 
the knowledge and insight necessary to harness current and potential challenges, 
we are interested in exploring the driving forces of the economic performance of 
the big and small enterprises in development zones. We pay special attention to the 
impact of industrial linkages, given that firms may differ in proximity to supplier/
resources and other resources available to them. 
To achieve this purpose, we collected firm-level data by surveying the partici-
pating firms located along the Yangtze River in the development zones of Jiangsu 
Province, and then adopted a variety of formal econometric methods to conduct 
an empirical analysis. There are three reasons why we chose Jiangsu Province as 
the subject of our study. (1) Access to regional industrial data is easily available. 
(2) The Yangtze River Delta is an area where development zones are concentrated. 
Because China has not balanced the distribution of its development zones, over 
70 percent of its development zones are concentrated in 30 percent of the national 
area. Over 60 percent of state-level development zones are in less than 20 percent 
of the national area, and 65 percent of the provincial-level development zones 
are in about 15 percent of the national area.1 (3) In terms of economic power, the 
Yangtze River Delta is considered a key barometer of the Chinese economy, and 
Jiangsu is an engine of the Delta’s economic growth as one of the strongest and most 
flourishing provincial economies. Therefore, understanding the characteristics of 
firm performance in Jiangsu’s development zones will help us to make an objective 
assessment and offer development proposals with important implications for other 
development zones in China, since most of them share similar characteristics.
By running an ordered logistic regression, we found a positive but nonsignifi-
cant effect of industrial linkages on firm performance in the development zones 
of Jiangsu Province. This empirical finding is associated with current global and 
domestic situations that have changed the way participating firms operate and 
organize in some Chinese development zones. When many other significant vari-
ables prevail over industrial linkages in driving superior firm performance, firms 
feel it less important to get closer to their suppliers or customers, thus leading to 
an insignificant effect of industrial linkages on firm performance. 
Literature Review
Industrial linkages are an important indicator of agglomeration. The concept of 
agglomeration, which refers to the spatial concentration of people and economic 
activities, can be traced back at least to the intellectual legacy of Marshall (1890), 
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who stated that the geographical concentration of economic activities can have a 
snowball effect whereby new entrants tend to agglomerate to benefit from higher 
diversity and specialization in production processes. In the century since Marshall’s 
view was put forward, the discussion of industrial clusters has attracted the atten-
tion of both practitioners and academics. As summarized by Bekele and Jackson 
(2006), agglomeration advantages studied by classical scholars generally involve 
three sets: external economies of scale, industrial linkages, and the mechanism that 
gives economic advantages to individual firms agglomerating in a certain locality 
with other similar and related firms.
The literature in economic geography and allied fields has emerged from, and 
is heavily dependent on, this strand of classical work. Recognizing industrial 
linkages as an important agglomeration factor in the industrial cluster, a grow-
ing number of economists have engaged in a variety of investigations seeking to 
document and substantiate the expected impacts, contributing to a wide range of 
academic disciplines and policy circles (Cella 1984; Parr 1999; Sonis, Hewings, 
and Guo 2000). A great many researchers, attempting to account for the regional 
and national agglomeration of economic activities, have suggested that selected 
regions—especially those in which industries are linked in transaction-intensive 
networks—are capable of exerting powerful push effects on national or regional 
economic development (Fujita and Thisse 2002; Krugman 1991, 1995; Krugman 
and Venables 1996). At the firm-level scale, many other scholars have accepted 
the notion that linkage benefits derived from cluster occupancy lead to superior 
firm performance because of savings on transportation costs, shared infrastructure, 
increased availability of labor, forward and backward linkages, and/or knowledge 
and technology spillovers (Debaere, Lee, and Paik 2009). Interesting arguments 
about the positive impact of industrial linkages can also be found in a sizable num-
ber of empirical studies on industrial clustering. In a study of the semiconductor 
industry in Southeast Asia, Scott (1987) showed that production units in Manila’s 
semiconductor complex in the mid-1980s were clustered and were intricately 
linked to minimize transaction costs. In similar fashion, a variety of studies have 
highlighted positive externalities and productive effects of industrial clusters in 
East Asia, where many of the most vibrant industrial districts are located in large 
city regions. For example, Singapore, Seoul, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shanghai 
harbor many specialized industrial districts that draw on dense local supplies of 
skilled labor, educational and research facilities, and infrastructure. Levy (1991) 
contends that the transaction-cost hypothesis provides a powerful explanation for 
the emergence of localized subcontracting networks in Taiwan, while Park (1994) 
found that high-technology firms in South Korea cluster together because of high 
levels of access to technical labor.
Paradoxically, however, in the case of Malaysia, Rasiah’s (1994) empirical study 
of the machine-tool industry underscores the connection between subcontracting 
and localization. This indicates that some of the benefits of industrial linkages may 
be offset by higher production costs resulting from the greater competition among 
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firms for land, labor, and other inputs. Coincident with higher productivity, rents 
and wages may increase and transportation costs may arise due to congestion. 
Therefore, the net benefits of industrial interdependence may be marginal for the 
sectors with low-skilled labor and standardized technologies. In other words, as 
the demand for higher-quality production factors and more advanced technology 
is intensified, many other economic effects might prevail over industrial linkages 
in driving superior firm performance. Current theory in economic geography lends 
some support to this view by acknowledging the importance of institutional fac-
tors in promoting localized growth and development. In many countries, including 
those in East Asia, governments have played a notably directive role in assigning 
investment to different localities and setting up development zones and other local-
development schemes, thereby shaping regional economic outcomes (Porter 1990). 
Within the context of China, Rong (2004) studied four classical development models 
of small and medium-sized enterprises and found that the policies and services 
provided by governments and social organizations are conducive to the growing 
cluster development of enterprises. Empirical evidence from a set of studies of other 
countries also stresses the impact of governmental and organizational support for the 
promotion of industrial clustering. For instance, Meyer-Stamer (1999) studied the 
history of industrial clustering in Santa Catarina, a Brazilian state, and demonstrated 
that successful development of industries depends not only on national and local 
government policies and institutional arrangements, but also on the enterprises and 
industry associations that take part in cooperation and interaction. 
Given the positive and negative sides of industrial linkages, it is therefore 
uncertain, at this point, how important industrial linkages are in influencing firm 
performance in an industrial cluster. With its history of centralized economic 
planning and the rapid expansion in the number of development zones, China 
presents an especially interesting case, as detailed studies on industrial linkages 
in the development zones of China are relatively limited. Very often, the research 
literature related to our understanding of development zones is based on aggrega-
tion formation. That is, theoretical analysis and empirical documents on the role 
of development zones mainly arise from the perspective of macro-data research. 
By contrast, data-based micro-enterprises are the driving forces of the zone-to-
business gathering. Although there are some studies confirming the existence of 
agglomeration, few studies look into the effects of industrial linkages as an indicator 
of agglomeration on firm performance, especially in Chinese development zones, 
at the firm-level scale.
The empirical analysis in this article makes use of questionnaire data collected 
from enterprises in China’s development zones. First, we quantitatively evaluate 
the connection between industrial linkages and firm performance, a rarely tested 
issue of research at the firm level, based on the regression results obtained from 
estimating an ordered logistic model. Second, most of the literature on industrial 
agglomeration and economic performance has been concerned with empirical situ-
ations in advanced developed countries. In this article, we demonstrate not only 
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that the cluster approach is as useful in the context of a developing country as it 
is in Western situations, but that it can also shed insight on critical dilemmas of 
development that are specific to a developing country. In particular, in an attempt to 
promote successful behavior by firms and to increase the sustainability of Chinese 
development zones, we focus on the most flourishing economic region in China, 
the Yangtze River Delta. In short, our investigation includes policymakers very 
concerned with promoting regional and national economic growth, as well as firm 
managers eager to pursue sustainability of firm growth in development zones. 
Econometric Modeling
In light of the literature discussed above, we construct a linear regression model that 
is particularly designed for estimating the relationship between firm performance 
and industrial linkages. The econometric model takes the following form:
y = β0 + β1*il + β2*V + β3*α + ε,              (1)
where y symbolizes the firm’s performance, and il stands for the variables of 
industrial linkage. To overcome the potential econometric challenges of omitted 
variable bias and the problem of endogeneity, we include V as a vector for the firm-
level control variables which are likely to influence firm performance, as justified 
by a considerable number of studies with different research focuses. These include 
firm size (Lee 2009), firm age (Hannon and Freeman 1989), ownership structure 
of firms (Jones, Kalmi, and Mygind 2003), intensity of inputs (Hall 1999), human 
capital of workers (Marimuthu, Arokiasamy, and Ismail 2009), and characteristics 
of business owners/managers (Colombo and Grilli 2005; Hyungrae and Lee 1996; 
Mengistae 2006). In addition, we control for city effects (the α term), recognizing 
that the development zones in our study may have a potential issue of locational 
heterogeneity. 
Firm performance measurement is an issue that often attracts debate. Many re-
searchers have relied on objective measures in terms of turnover, profitability, export 
sales, productivity, maintenance efficiency, on-time delivery, lead-time, capacity 
utilization, and quality. While conventional wisdom would credit objective measures 
with higher accuracy and objectivity, a sizable number of researchers have relied 
on the use of subjective performance measures for the following reasons: (a) the 
difficulty of obtaining objective performance data; (b) performance data shaped by 
industry-specific factors are inappropriate for cross-industry comparisons; and (c) 
the strong correlation between objective and subjective measures. With the support 
of local governments in Jiangsu Province, we were able to collect perceptual data 
based on top managers’ subjective assessments of the performance of their firms 
in terms of product success, sales and market share growth, and profitability on a 
five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = “poor” to 5 = “excellent.” The use of 
perceptual measures is not without precedent. Researchers have found that measures 
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of perceived organizational performance data are positively correlated with objective 
measures of firm performance (Dollinger and Golden 1992; Powell 1992).
Since the variable of firm performance is ordinal and has more than two levels, 
we have a choice between ordered logistic regression (ordered logit) and ordered 
probit models. According to Heij, de Boer, Franses, Kloek, and van Dijk (2004), 
the basic set-up of an ordered response model arises from a relationship between 
the outcome yi  and the index function:
y       i
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Let F be the cumulative distribution function of εi, then we can express the 
model in terms of probabilities: 
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Given the above definition for pij, the log likelihood function for ordered logistic 
regression becomes:
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 (5)
where yij = 1 if yi = j, and yif = 0 if yij ≠ j. The function F should be specified, and 
in practice one often takes the stand normal or the logistic distribution. 
Data and Variables
Prior to estimating the parameters in our ordered response model, we investigated 
our survey data for 244 firms located along the Yangtze River in the development 
zones of Jiangsu Province in the year 2005. The questionnaire was divided into 
three parts: firm profile, complementary information about the firm, and personal 
attributes of the firm owner. The profile of firms included firm ownership, size, 
age, status of performance, and type based on input-intensity. The complementary 
information on the enterprise’s basics included motivations for entering a develop-
ment zone, the relationship between upstream and downstream enterprises, human 
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capital resources, firm satisfaction with policies and services of government and 
development zone authorities, and experience with technology upgrading. The per-
sonal traits of the firm owner included information about gender, age, educational 
level, income, tenure, and work experience of relevant service. 
As summarized in Table 1, the surveyed enterprises in the development zones 
along the Yangtze River were located in eight cities: Suzhou, Jiangyin, Nanjing, 
Changzhou, Taizhou, Zhenjiang, Yangzhou, and Nantong. Of the 244 firms, 97 were 
located in the first four cities located in the south of Jiangsu Province, while 147 
were in the other four cities in the north of Jiangsu. There were 55 in Changzhou 
and 56 in Nantong. Zhenjiang, Yangzhou, and Jiangyin had 39, 35, and 28 firms, 
respectively. In short, the firms in these five cities accounted for 87.3 percent of 
the total number of firms in the sample. The total of 144 sampled enterprises were 
mainly distributed in one of three industries: textiles, raw chemical materials and 
chemical products, and machinery and electronic equipment manufacturing, ac-
counting for 59.2 percent of the total sample. In terms of firm ownership, there 
were only ten state-owned and collective enterprises in the sampled development 
zones. The shares owned by private investors, foreign investors, Hong Kong-, 
Macao-, and Taiwan-invested enterprises, and joint-stock enterprises were almost 
the same, with 56, 68, 53, and 40, respectively. From the perspective of firm size, 
mid-sized and small enterprises dominated. There were 109 medium-sized and 
95 small enterprises, accounting for 84.6 percent of the total sample, with only 
4 super-sized and 33 large enterprises in the sample. Therefore, the development 
zones in the study were able to maintain healthy competition without the existence 
of oligopolies or monopolies in the zones. As a result, their economic performance 
was less dependent on the composition of monopoly profits. In addition, about half 
of the enterprises in the development zones of interest were new entrants. Only 6 
firms started to operate before the year 1980, 109 firms started during the 1980s and 
1990s, and 120 enterprises entered later. To some extent, the development zones 
along the Yangtze River are mainly populated by young companies.
In our empirical model, as described in Table 2, the dependent variable (Per-
Form) represents firm economic performance and is measured by choosing a 
set of five ordered responses: poor, fair, good, very good, and excellent. We are 
particularly interested in investigating the effect of industrial linkages on firm 
performance. Hence, a dummy variable (FlinK1) is created with the value of 1 
for firms in development zones clustered with their suppliers in the same location. 
Another dummy variable (FlinK2) is created with the value of 1 for firms in 
development zones located close to the customers who would like to purchase the 
goods and services they provide. 
To control for the potential problem of omitted variable bias, we include as 
many factors as possible that influence firm performance. Here, we consider control 
variables related to company profile, complementary information on the company, 
and personal traits of the firm owner. The variables describing the basic profile of 
enterprises include: 
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Table 2
Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition
PERFORM Economic performance of firm (ordinal variable)
CZ Changzhou (dummy variable)
TZ Taizhou (dummy variable)
YZ Yangzhou (dummy variable)
SZ Suzhou (dummy variable)
NJ Nanjing (dummy variable)
JY Jiangyin (dummy variable)
ZJ Zhenjiang (dummy variable)
NT Nantong (dummy variable)
FLINK1 Closeness to firm’s suppliers (dummy variable)
FLINK2 Closeness to firm’s customers (dummy variable)
FTEC Technological updating or innovation (dummy variable)
FAID Government funding of R&D (dummy variable)
FSATF
Firm’s satisfaction with governmental policies and services in develop-
ment zone (dummy variable)
ECON1 Percentage of workers directly from local region 
ECON2 Percentage of general technical personnel directly from local region 
ECON3 Percentage of senior technical staff directly from local region 
ECON4 Percentage of middle-level managers directly from local region 
ECON5 Percentage of senior managers directly from local region 
YEAR Firm age
YEAR2 Square term of firm age
LABOR Labor-intensive firm (dummy variable)
CAPITAL Capital-intensive firm (dummy variable)
KNOW Knowledge-intensive firm (dummy variable)
S1 State-owned firm (dummy variable)
S2 Collective firm (dummy variable)
S3 Private firm (dummy variable)
S4 Foreign investment firm (dummy variable)
S5 Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan-funded firm (dummy variable)
S6 Joint-stock firm (dummy variable)
S7 Other types of firm (dummy variable)
SIZE1 Super-sized firm (dummy variable)
SIZE2 Large firm (dummy variable)
SIZE3 Medium-sized firm (dummy variable)
SIZE4 Small firm (dummy variable)
EDU1 Firm owner with high school degree or below (dummy variable)
EDU2 Firm owner with associate degree (dummy variable)
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1. Size of firm. Participating firms are divided into four groups: super-sized, 
large, medium-sized, and small. Each category is matched with a dummy 
variable: SIZE1, SIZE2, SIZE3, and SIZE4. 
2. Ownership of firm. Firms are categorized as state-owned, collective, 
private, foreign investment, Hong Kong-, Macao-, and Taiwan-funded, joint-
stock companies, or other. Correspondingly, seven dummy variables were 
generated: S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, and S7, respectively. 
3. Type of firm. Based on the intensity of production factors, firms were 
grouped as labor-intensive, capital-intensive, or knowledge-intensive. Three 
relevant dummy variables were created to capture each group: LABOR, 
CAPITAL, and KNOW. 
4. Age of firm. In order to look at the interrelation between the firm’s age 
(YEAR) and its performance in the development zones of interest, the square 
term (YEAR2) was added, since this relationship is more likely to be quadratic. 
The second type of control variables include the proportion of employees who 
are local, calculating that employment of local staff may be more conducive to 
business because of their network of relationships. Hence, we examined the im-
pact of workers, general technical personnel, senior technical staff, middle-level 
managers, and senior managers, all of whom directly come from local regions. In 
the regression, we generated five variables (eCon1, eCon2, eCon3, eCon4, 
and eCon5) to represent these five groups, respectively, with each measured by 
the percentage of total employment in the firm. To investigate how technological 
opportunities may generate cumulative advantages for clusters, the participating 
firms in the study were surveyed as to whether they had completed technologi-
cal updating or innovation recently, and whether they received any governmental 
support for their inventive or innovative activities. The answers helped us to add 
two more dummy variables (FTeC) as well as (FAiD) in order to understand the 
economic effects of technological progress and government funding of R&D on 
firm performance. To verify that highly satisfied firms in the development zones are 
more efficient, we generated a dummy variable (FsATF) that assumes the value of 
1 if the answer is yes to any of the following questions, such as whether the firms is 
EDU3 Firm owner with bachelor degree or above (dummy variable)
RTIM2 Tenure in current company
RTIM2S Square term of tenure
RTIM1 Work experience of relevant service
RTIM1S Square term of work experience
AINCOME
Annual income received by respondent as a firm owner/manager 
(ordinal variable)
Variable Definition
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satisfied with government policies/services, whether the services the firm receives 
are in line with its initial expectations, whether the firm keeps in good contact/
communication with governmental agencies, and whether the firm has received 
satisfactory service from industrial associations. 
In the last type of control variables, we take into account the characteristics of 
business owners (or managers).
1. Level of education. In terms of human capital theory, educational levels 
increase the ability of owners and thus improve the economic performance 
of their enterprises. Three dummy variables were used: EDU1 equals 1 for 
owners who have received a high school degree or below, EDU2 equals 1 for 
those who have an associate’s degree, and EDU3 equals 1 for owners with a 
bachelor’s degree or above.
2. Work experience of relevant service (RTIM1). 
3. Tenure in the current company (RTIM2). Several studies have revealed 
that experience fosters firm performance, as competence-enhancing activities 
implied by aging favor the implementation of established routines, or allow 
entrepreneurs to better recognize and exploit new technological opportunities 
(Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen, and Zilibotti 2006; Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990). On the other hand, aging may negatively affect firm 
performance because of inertia (Miller 1991). As founders-managers grow 
older, they may become more conservative, more reliant on their own sources 
of information for making decisions, less likely to take risks, and less flexible 
in handling conflicts (Van Praag 2003). Due to these contrasting effects of 
aging, we gathered the empirical evidence on the effects of work experience 
and tenure of firm owners/managers on firm performance. The regression 
also includes the square terms for these two variables (rTim1s and rTim2s), 
to study whether work experience and tenure have increasing or decreasing 
marginal effects over time. 
Finally, since information was collected from eight different cities in Jiangsu 
Province, we created seven dummy variables (CZ, TZ, nJ, sZ, Jy, ZJ, nT, and yZ) 
for Changzhou, Taizhou, Nanjing, Suzhou, Jiangyin, Zhenjiang, Nantong, and 
Yangzhou, respectively, in order to capture the city fixed-effects.
Table 3 provides the basic descriptive statistics for all the variables. As reported, 
these statistics, in terms of the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum, 
are quite standard without the disturbance of outliers or extreme values, forming 
the basis of every quantitative analysis of data in our study.
Empirical Results and Analysis
In order to analyze the impact of industrial linkages on firm performance, we adopted 
an ordered logistic regression, given the fact that the variable of firm performance 
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Table 3
Basic Descriptive Statistics for All Variables
Variable Mean Str.deviation Min Max
PERFORM 3.5 0.7498148 1 5
CZ 0.2254098 0.4187108 0 1
TZ 0.0696721 0.255117 0 1
YZ 0.1434426 0.3512442 0 1
SZ 0.0204918 0.1419665 0 1
NJ 0.0368852 0.1888675 0 1
JY 0.1147541 0.3193801 0 1
ZJ 0.1598361 0.3672072 0 1
NT 0.2295082 0.4213809 0 1
FLINK1 0.173913 0.3799536 0 1
FLINK2 0.1556604 0.3633911 0 1
FTEC 0.5931373 0.4924574 0 1
FAID 0.2540984 0.436248 0 1
FSATF 0.9628099 0.1896195 0 1
ECON1 0.72055 0.2700497 0.02 1
ECON2 0.7423958 0.2612946 0.02 1
ECON3 0.6428481 0.3182778 0.01 1
ECON4 0.744153 0.281564 0 1
ECON5 0.7246541 0.3106196 0.01 1
YEAR 7.225532 7.603712 0 47
YEAR2 109.7787 258.5111 0 2,209
LABOR 0.2459016 0.4315057 0 1
KNOW 0.2581967 0.4385423 0 1
S1 0.0041494 0.0644157 0 1
S2 0.0373444 0.1899989 0 1
S3 0.2323651 0.4232196 0 1
S4 0.2821577 0.4509863 0 1
S5 0.219917 0.4150522 0 1
S6 0.1659751 0.3728326 0 1
S7 0.0580913 0.2344028 0 1
SIZE1 0.0165975 0.1280236 0 1
SIZE2 0.1369295 0.3444883 0 1
SIZE3 0.4522822 0.4987536 0 1
(continued)
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as a dependent variable is a response variable with five ordered levels. One of the 
assumptions underlying ordinal logistic regression is that the relationships between 
each pair of outcome groups are the same. In other words, ordinal logistic regression 
assumes that the coefficients describing the relationships between the lowest and 
all the higher categories of the response variable are the same as those describing 
the relationship between the next-lowest category and all higher categories. This 
is called the proportional odds assumption or the parallel regression assumption. 
Hence, prior to estimation, we need to test whether this assumption holds true. For 
this purpose, we perform a likelihood ratio test with the null hypothesis stating that 
there is no difference in the coefficients between models. As expected, we get a 
nonsignificant result with the p-value greater than the significance level of 5 percent. 
This means that we have not violated the proportional odds assumption. Since there 
is only one set of coefficients, we are able to move on and run an ordered logistic 
model to describe the relationships between each pair of outcome groups. 
To solve the problem of multicollinearity, we drop the variables nJ, sZ, s1, s7, 
siZe2, and eDU1. To overcome the potential problem of heteroskedasticity, we 
turn to the computation of robust standard deviations to avoid the biased standard 
errors and test statistics. As far as the measure of the goodness of fit is concerned, 
the likelihood ratio Χ2 of 86.86 with a p-value of 0.000 suggests that our model as 
a whole is statistically significant, as compared to the model with no predictors, 
while the pseudo-r2 is 0.4246, indicating that this model fits the outcome data in 
a good way. 
Effect of Industrial Linkages on Firm Performance
To answer our major research question, we look at the coefficients on indus-
trial linkages represented by FlinK1 and FlinK2. As reported in Table 4, these 
coefficients are positive and therefore consistent with the basic mechanism of 
Table 3 (Continued)
Variable Mean Str.deviation Min Max
SIZE4 0.3941909 0.4896932 0 1
EDU1 0.2 0.4008919 0 1
EDU2 0.5044248 0.5010903 0 1
EDU3 0.2876106 0.4536534 0 1
RTIM2 6.426484 6.468174 0.4 37
RTIM2S 82.94594 171.1593 0.16 1,369
RTIM1 11.08257 8.26836 0.33 40
RTIM1S 190.8811 269.4294 0.1089 1,600
AINCOME 4.357466 1.315571 1 9
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industrial linkages that brings about the agglomeration of economic activities and 
consequently leads to positive firm performance. However, industrial linkages are 
not statistically significant at a 5 percent significance level. This empirical result 
is complemented by the collected answers of firm owners/managers to our survey 
questions. As tabulated, among 207 surveyed firms located in the development 
zones of Jiangsu Province, 82.6 percent of the firms did not choose to locate close 
to their upstream firms (suppliers) in the same zone. Among the 212 surveyed 
firms in these areas, 84.4 percent of the firms did not to choose to stay close to the 
downstream firms (customers) that would like to purchase their goods or services. 
This phenomenon leads us to believe that development zones may not function as 
a major channel through which firms feel highly motivated to get closer to their 
upstream or downstream customers. Table 5 confirms this belief by ranking all of 
the motives of firms in the development zones of interest from scale 1 to scale 7.2 
The highest motivation for participating firms to enter a development zone is to 
obtain the preferential policies/treatments granted by the central government or 
local governments. By contrast, the surveyed firms are less motivated to enter a 
development zone simply to pursue industrial linkages. 
In light of these different motives, we take a step further to explore why many 
firms do not intend to take advantage of the traditional gains of industrial linkage 
when entering the development zones in Jiangsu Province. We come up with several 
reasons. First, although industrial linkages do not serve an important role in the de-
velopment zones of Jiangsu, this does not mean that firms in these areas do not have 
a close relationship with their customers and/or suppliers. As Table 6 lists, contacts 
between firms in the development zones of Jiangsu Province and their upstream/
downstream firms mainly rest with product quality and market information. The 
upstream and downstream enterprises contribute a lot to the technological upgrad-
ing of firms in the development zones. When the  collected data are compiled, it 
can be inferred that, rather than simply choosing development zones as a carrier of 
industrial linkages, firms in the zones are able to smoothly communicate and share 
their ideas on how to carry out transactions through many other channels.
 Second, the benefits of industrial linkages could be tempered by the high 
cost of clustering, including increased market competition if products are more 
homogeneous and/or locally consumed, and if scarce input resources tend to be 
exhausted very quickly. In Jiangsu Province, there has been a consistent increase 
of labor costs, long undervalued. As a result, the previous low-cost strategy is no 
longer sustainable and an increase in relative factor costs might cause significant 
job losses. Going beyond this evidence, a number of development issues associ-
ated with economic inefficiency remain. Since the “development zone fever” of 
the 1990s, an explosive boom of development zones has generated a loss of arable 
land, abuse of the policy and administrative systems, uncoordinated urban sprawl, 
ineffectiveness of infrastructure and services, real estate speculation, and even 
environmental deterioration. When wage rates increase, tax breaks are reduced, 
and many other production costs go up, firms in the development zone will face 
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more intensified competition for scarce resources. Some firms may close down 
and move to places where they can acquire cheaper production factors and more 
generous incentive packages. 
Third, the above development issues have also increased the complexities of 
development-zone planning and management. This is not confined to attracting 
foreign investment. The imperative issues are more related to providing a livable 
environment for firms within these areas. Tremendous pressures have been imposed 
on local governments as well as development zone authorities to improve their 
managerial capacity to cope with the increasing dynamics and uncertainties gener-
ated by the current spatial and social transformation of the development zones. In 
the case of Jiangsu Province, its local governments and authorities have responded 
by raising standards for attracting foreign investment and relevant industries. Con-
sequently, many newly established foreign-funded enterprises have chosen to settle 
in underdeveloped areas of northern Jiangsu Province, together with unqualified 
enterprises that failed to pass governmental standards. Fourth, the accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 implied that globalization would now be 
an irreversible trend in China. As many researchers argue, providing considerable 
benefits to foreign/domestic investors in development zones limits new investment 
in national and local economies and fails to address the country’s socioeconomic, 
labor, land, and regional problems (Wong and Tang 2005). These policies will be 
curtailed soon, and many other preferential policies will be neutralized or even 
eliminated in the near future. With China’s rapid integration into the global economy, 
the continuing contribution of development zones to regional development and the 
superior performance of participating firms become questionable. If development 
zones lose their competitive advantage, firms will have more geographical choices 
Table 6
Contact Modes
Contact with upstream 
firms Votes
Contact with  
downstream firms Votes
Meet requirements for  
reliable quality 
142 Meet requirements for  
reliable quality 
120
Update technology 43 Update technology 62
Expedite response service 69 Expedite response service 66
Provide financial support 28 Deliver goods in time 84
Provide market information 83 Provide financial support 34
Other supports 3 Provide market information 121
Missing data 60 Other supports 4
Missing data 52
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and development zones will face an increasing number of competing locations that 
offer comparable conditions to industrial investors.
Effect of Other Determinants of Firm Performance
Changing global and domestic conditions may have caused certain development 
zones to lose their advantages over other areas, including nondevelopment zones, 
and to some extent have weakened the impact of industrial linkages in these zones. 
If so, firms will have to respond by changing the way they operate and organize, 
especially when many other significant factors take precedence over industrial 
linkages to improve firm performance. According to our regression results, al-
though industrial linkages are not significant, we find that, among all the control 
variables, siZe3, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, eCon4, FAiD, FsATF, rTim1, and rTim1s 
are statistically significant. This suggests that firm owners/managers are less likely 
to consider the issue of whether their firms should get closer to their customers 
or suppliers to be a top priority. These significant results deserve special attention 
because they shed light on our study of industrial linkages by providing insightful 
policy/management implications. 
    First, relative to the large-sized companies chosen as a base group, firms of 
other sizes appear not to perform well in the development zones of Jiangsu. This 
comparison reflects the fact that medium and small firms in these zones are less 
efficient, experienced, and skillful to tackle a variety of operating difficulties, such 
as dealing with financial problems, building trust with new customers, or competing 
against large multinationals. Hence, to encourage enterprises to become bigger and 
stronger, the authorities in the development zones need to provide a more favorable 
environment for small and medium-sized enterprises, such as designing a layout to 
support enterprises in more flexible and with more open vision, and /or expanding 
direct financing channels. 
    Second, as far as firm ownership is concerned (represented by variables s1–s7), 
we note that state-owned companies are less competitive and productive than other 
types of companies in the Jiangsu zones. The major reason is that state-owned 
companies in these zones are less productive and unable to catch up with quality 
standards, and consequently they cannot compete with other firms effectively. This 
suggests that it is necessary for the development zones to figure out other efficient 
ways to strengthen the relations of these enterprises with state-owned enterprises 
and to promote their competitiveness. 
    Third, in terms of the proportion of employees who are local (eCon), we find 
that middle-level managers are less business savvy. The possible scenario might 
be that top managers are generally appointed by a parent company and are not 
familiar with the local rules of game, therefore leading to problems of economic 
inefficiency. 
    Fourth, although a number of studies have emphasized the importance of tech-
nological efforts for competitive advantages, this article reveals that governmental 
mArCh–APril 2011 99
funding for innovative activities (denoted by FAiD) has a greater impact than tech-
nological capability on firm performance in the development zones of Jiangsu (Zhao 
and Zhang 2007). This finding is consistent with the record of Chinese government 
programs supporting technological progress in the past. However, a majority of 
firms in the development zones of Jiangsu belong to traditional industries. They 
have not popularized and applied the achievements made in science and technol-
ogy, and consequently have failed to improve their innovative activities to serve 
their economic construction in a significant way.
    Fifth, when we turn our attention to the variables describing the personal char-
acteristics of owners (managers), including education, age, work experience, and 
tenure, we find that the only significant impact on firm performance results from 
work experience in related services (rTim1). The insignificance of education, 
age, and turnover might be because most firms in the development zones still do 
not place much emphasis on technological progress and innovation. As a result, 
the variables capturing the performance of entrepreneurship have not become a 
main engine for superior firm performance in the development zones. However, 
we do find that the additional effect of work experience on firm performance is 
significant and increases as the number of years spent in relevant service rises. 
More interestingly, given the negative coefficient of the square of rTim1, we 
further note that work experience has a diminishing effect as the number of years 
of service gets longer. This evidence supports the point already made by other 
economists, indicating that founders/managers tend to be more conservative, less 
likely to confront risks, and less flexible in handling conflict when they stay too 
long in a company or business. 
    Finally, the control variable used to describe firm satisfaction with the develop-
ment zones of Jiangsu Province (FsATF) implies that the development zones are 
generally acknowledged to have played a very positive role. This in spite of rapid 
economic globalization and domestic situations presenting varied challenges to the 
sustainable development of these zones. Hence, firms are still, on average, satis-
fied with the basic services provided in the development zones—a carryover from 
government-led economic growth, with a high motivation to take advantage of 
favorable provisions of financial and tax-preferential policies and other investment 
benefits granted in development zones. Ultimately, a choice selection will winnow 
out the traditional gains of industrial linkage (close to markets for products and/
or production elements). 
Robustness Checks
So far we have focused on the subjective measure of perceived organizational per-
formance. To check the robustness of our empirical results, we employ an alterna-
tive measure of firm performance. Economic theory and empirical evidence have 
shown a close link between firm performance and manager compensation in China, 
as sales growth is significantly linked to manager compensation and managers 
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are penalized for making negative profits (Kato and Long 2004). This perspective 
suggests that the annual income of top managers/owners (denoted by AinCome) 
can be an objective variable to measure firm performance. To adopt the same logit 
regression approach, we break the variable of AinCome into the following nine 
categories: (1) less than RMB5,000, (2) RMB5,000–8,000, (3) RMB8,000–10,000, 
(4) RMB10,000–30,000, (5) RMB30,000–50,000, (6) RMB50,000–100,000, (7) 
RMB100,000–200,000, (8) RMB200,000–500,000, and (9) above RMB 500,000. 
Compared to benchmark results, there is no change in the sign or significance of 
the estimated coefficients on industrial linkages. Meanwhile, at the 10 percent 
significance level, we still find important roles played by FAiD, FsATF, and rTim 
in this alternative regression, confirming that, rather than industrial linkages, there 
exist many other contributing factors that can lead to better firm performance.
Additionally, we ran ordered probit regressions as well as OLS regressions, using 
either the subjective or the objective measure of firm performance. As shown in 
Table 4 and Table 7, the empirical results regarding the effect of industrial linkages 
still remain insignificant. In summary, these robustness checks are consistent with 
our key research hypothesis that the impact of current industrial linkages on firm 
performance has been weakened in some Chinese development zones.
Conclusion
This article investigates the effect of industrial linkages on the performance of 
firms in Chinese development zones. We conducted a survey of firms located in 
the development zones of Jiangsu Province and then developed a well-grounded 
econometric model derived from existing economic theory, taking into account 
features of the available survey data. After running an ordered logistic regression 
with potential econometric problems controlled, we examined our regression results 
to sort out the important determinants of firm performance, and, particularly, to 
interpret how industrial linkages affect performance at the firm level. 
Our empirical work reveals an insignificant relationship between industrial link-
ages and firm performance in the case of Jiangsu Province. We find that develop-
mental problems and challenges posed by the current rapid growth of globalization 
have changed the way participating firms operate and organize. When many other 
economic effects take precedence over industrial linkages in driving superior firm 
performance, firms in the Jiangsu development zones feel it less important to get 
closer to their suppliers or customers, thereby weakening the impact of industrial 
linkages on firm performance. 
Coordinating our discoveries, we propose that when the role of industrial link-
ages becomes less important in a development zone, policymakers and firm owners/
managers should be more concerned with other significant determinants of firm 
performance. These include improving efficiency to handle operating difficulties, 
creating a more sound investment climate to attract private firms, collective firms, 
and foreign-investment-funded firms, hiring more middle-level managers from local 
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regions to expand a business network, increasing government funding to support 
technological upgrading, and boosting the entrepreneurship of top management 
teams. According to our benchmark results, these positive factors will vastly con-
tribute to the continued growth of firm performance, despite the insignificance of 
industrial linkages in some development zones. 
We would like to mention some limitations of our study relating to design, data, 
and methodology. We collected the needed data using survey methodology, which 
is not as fine-grained as scenario construction or in-depth case studies. Despite this 
fact, the difficulty of observing attitudes, responses, and opinions, along with the 
desire to sample a large number of firms, means that surveys are still particularly 
useful in our research. Our sample consists only of firms in the development zones 
of a specific region, rather than the entire country. This limitation, however, is 
partially mitigated because Jiangsu Province in the Yangtze River Delta is a good 
representative of the most flourishing economic regions where the majority of 
China’s development zones are located. The use of a large sample that includes a 
variety of firms also helps to enhance the generalization of the results. The study 
relies on single respondents from each firm. Although multiple respondents would 
provide greater reliability, we believe that single respondents who are the owners or 
top managers of a firm know its characteristics and performance very well. Hence, 
the use of single respondents is adequate. Last, our research mainly focuses on 
industrial linkages as an important indicator of agglomeration. While industrial 
linkages are not a driving factor of firm performance in the case of Jiangsu’s de-
velopment zones, we do not deny the potential importance of other agglomeration 
factors, such as knowledge and technology spillovers. However, these factors are 
beyond the scope of this study given the data limitation. 
Notes
1. See “Research Report of Chinese Development Zone Industry, 2009,” available 
at www.scribd.com/doc/15642951/Research-Report-of-Chinese-Development-Zone-
Industry-2009.
2. The rankings are calculated based on weighing factors that are estimated values in-
dicating the relative importance or impact of each item in a group as compared to the other 
items in the group. Here, we assign 7 to the first selected motive, 6 to the second selected 
motive, and so on, until 1 to the last selected motive. For instance, in terms of the category 
of “Direct Access to Raw Material,” five firms consider it the first motive, 4 firms choose it 
as the second motive, 3 firms select it as the third motive, and then 4 firms, 5 firms, 3 firms, 
and 1 firm, respectively, based on the order of its importance. Hence, the weight is 112 (= 
[5*7] + [4*6] + [3*5] + [4*4] + [5*3] + [3*2] + [1*1]). 
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